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CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Segall v. Shore' was an intra familia battle over the busi-
nesses left by the late Max Shore. The action was brought by the
decedent's daughter, Jean Segall, and her two children as benefi-
ciaries under the will of Max Shore. The complaint charged two
of the decedent's sons, Reuben and Sidney Shore, and an accoun-
tant of the Shore businesses, Morris Root, with mismanaging the
operation of the three businesses following Max Shore's death in
1971.2 Also, Jean Segall, as an executor and trustee under the will
of Max Segall, sued the same three individuals for breach of their
duties as executors and trustees under the will of Max Shore.
At the time of his death, Max Shore held an interest in three
business concerns:
1) all of the common stock in MacShore Classics, Inc. (Clas-
sics);
2) 25% of the common stock of the Shore Company, Inc.
(Shore Company); and
3) a one-third interest in the partnership Carolina Blouse
Company (Carolina Blouse).'
All three businesses were involved in one single activity, the pro-
duction of goods for the Lady Arrow Division of Cluett Peabody
and Co., Inc. (Lady Arrow). The Shore Company held title to two
production plants; Classics purchased raw materials, subcon-
tracted the work and sold the finished goods to Lady Arrow; and
Carolina Blouse subcontracted the work from Classics.
The relationship with Lady Arrow began in 1969 when the
defendant Reuben Shore solicited business from Lady Arrow for
Carolina Blouse. From November 1970, until the death of Max
Shore, the sales to Lady Arrow were channeled through Classics,
apparently to take the tax advantage of earlier carry-forward
losses by Classics. Carolina Blouse was not adequately compen-
sated for its production costs by Classics; instead Classics made
loans to Carolina Blouse to cover the latter's uncompensated
1. 264 S.C. 442, 215 S.E.2d 895 (1975).
2. Two of the family businesses were closely-held corporations, MacShore Classics,
Inc. and the Shore Co., Inc. These corporations were named as defendants along with the
third family business, Carolina Blouse Co., a partnership.
3. 264 S.C. at 446, 215 S.E.2d at 898. Ownership of preferred stock in Classics will
be discussed infra. Max Shore was an equal partner with his two adult sons in Carolina
Blouse.
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costs. Prior to his death, Max Shore "totally dominated" the
financial affairs of the three businesses.
The action against the individual defendants charged that,
following the death of Max Shore, they had (1) failed to dissolve
the partnership Carolina Blouse and failed to render an
accounting to the estate of the deceased partner; (2) used their
position4 to appropriate corporate assets from Classics for their
own beneficial use in the undissolved Carolina Blouse; and (3)
used their position to occupy property of Shore Company without
paying a fair rental value. For these activities, the plaintiffs
sought an accounting of all business activities by the defendants
after January 1, 1972, and a court-ordered dissolution of the two
close corporations or, in the alternative, that the individual or
corporate defendants be ordered to purchase at fair market value
all of the plaintiffs' interest in the three businesses. In addition,
the plaintiffs urged that the redeemable preferred shares of Clas-
sic held by them be redeemed by that corporation.'
The case was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Green-
ville County, which entered judgment favorable to the plaintiffs
following a reference to the Master in Equity. In a per curiam
decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the decree
of the trial court and ordered it reported.' Because the lower court
decree issued by Judge Singletary cited no authorities, the discus-
sion herein will refer to South Carolina cases and statutes as well
as other relevant authorities with the aim of aiding the practi-
tioner in applying this precedent. In ordering the individual de-
fendants to render an accounting to the plaintiffs and the nomi-
nal defendant corporations, the court held the defendants to stan-
dards imposed under the Uniform Partnership Act,' the South
4. Reuben and Sidney Shore were equal partners in Carolina Blouse with Max Shore.
In addition, they were officers and directors in both of the closely-held corporations.
Morris Root was accountant for all three of the business concerns.
4.1 In addition, the plaintiff Jean Segall sought a declaration that she was the owner
of mutual fund certificates formerly owned by Max Shore. The court found that a parol
trust had been created by Max Shore and that beneficial ownership of the certificates had
passed to Jean Segall prior to Max Shore's death. Also, the court enforced an April 19,
1972 agreement setting forth the manner in which the proceeds of these certificates were
to be distributed. 264 S.C. at 452-53, 215 S.E.2d at 901.
5. At the beginning of the opinion's discussion of the law, Judge Singletary singled
out the individual defendants and chastised them for failing to adhere to the "high stan-
dard of candor and trust" imposed upon executors of a decedent's will. 264 S.C. at 448,
215 S.E.2d at 899.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-1 to -79 (1962).
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Carolina Business Corporation Act,7 and South Carolina case law.
Upon the death of a partner, a partnership is dissolved and
the legal representative of the deceased partner is entitled to an
accounting of the decedent's share.' Dissolution of the partner-
ship destroys the partnership powers except those exercised for
the purpose of winding up.'0 In failing both to dissolve Carolina
Blouse upon the death of Max Shore and to render an accounting
to the estate of their father, Reuben and Sidney Shore violated
these provisions of the South Carolina law. Since partners are
fiduciaries to one another or to the legal representative of a de-
ceased partner," the legal theory of constructive thrust operates
to make the defendant sons liable to their father's estate for his
interest valued at the time of his death. In addition, any income
earned by the sons' wrongful use of the assets is also recoverable
by the estate.'2 As part of the accounting of the partnership as-
sets, the supreme court remanded the case to the Master for a
determination of whether the debts of Carolina Blouse to Classics
were intended to be enforceable or were created only for tax pur-
poses. ,3
In addition to holding the individual defendants liable for
breach of fiduciary duties owned to the partnership,'4 the court
held Reuben and Sidney Shore liable for breach of duties owed
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§12-11.1 to -24.9 (Cur. Supp. 1975).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-63(4) (1962).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-79 (1962).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-65, 52-72 (1962).
11. S.C. CODE ANN, § 52-44 (1962).
12. 264 S.C. at 450, 215 S.E.2d at 900. The court did not use the term "constructive
trust." South Carolina law had earlier held a partner liable to a deceased partner's estate
for profits arising out of a breach of trust. Manship v. Newton, 94 S.C. 260, 77 S.E. 941
(1913). In addition, § 4(3) of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-4(3),
52-5 (1962)) states that the law of agency applies under that act. § 407(1) of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957) states:
If an agent has received a benefit as a result of violating his duty of loyalty, the
principal is entitled to recover from him what he has so received, its value, or
its proceeds, and also the amount of damages thereby caused; except that, if
the violation consists of the wrongful disposal of the principal's property, the
principal cannot recover its value and also what the agent received in exchange
therefor.
See generally Rizzo v. Rizzo, 3 Ill.2d 291, 120 N.E.2d 546 (1954); Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). The latter case contains Judge Cardozo's classic
standard for fiduciary conduct.
13. 264 S.C. at 450-51, 215 S.E.2d at 900.
14. The court did not discuss the breach of duty by the accountant of the three
businesses, Morris Root. Presumably, he acquiesced to or aided Reuben and Morris Shore
in their breaches.
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by them as officers and directors to the two corporations. Under
South Carolina law, officers and directors owe a duty of reason-
able care to their corporations and the shareholders thereof.'5
The court found that the defendants had breached this duty
owed to Classics by appropriating for their own use the Lady
Arrow relationship, a business opportunity belonging to Classics.
In holding Reuben and Sidney Shore accountable to Classics for
appropriation of the Lady Arrow opportunity and the resulting
profits,'6 the court followed the established remedy for a fidu-
ciary's self-enrichment at the corporation's expense:
As a corporate official breaches a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration if he appropriates for himself an opportunity rightfully
belonging to it, the corporation becomes entitled to all benefits
he receives from utilization of such an opportunity. A court's
usual approach is to impose a constructive trust on property the
disloyal official acquires in usurping the opportunity and to re-
quire him to transfer ownership of the property to the corpora-
tion. The court will also compel him to account to the corpora-
tion for any profits which the usurpation has produced.'
7
The court likewise applied the same principle in holding the de-
fendants accountable to Classics for damages and profits arising
from uncompensated use of the corporation's equipment.'
8
The court also found that the defendants, operating through
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.15 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
The directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their powers and dis-
charge their duties in good faith with a view to the interests of the corporation
and of the shareholders and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-
tions.
See also Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV.
275, 303 (1963) and Folk, The South Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations and
Prospects, 15 S.C.L. REV. 467, 479 (1963).
16. 264 S.C. at 449-50, 215 S.E.2d at 899-900.
17. F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINoRrrY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.17 (1975) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPE-
DIA OF CORPORATIONS § 861.1 (1965 ed.). In Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939) the court held:
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal
of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for
the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit
flowing from a breach of confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.
Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
18. 264 S.C. at 449-50; 215 S.E.2d at 899-900. See also F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF
MINomTY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.16 (1975).
1976]
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the undissolved Carolina Blouse, had paid inadequate rent for a
plant owned by the Shore Company but occupied by the defen-
dants. The defendants had been paying $60,000 annual rent, but
the court found that the fair market rental value for the plant,
occupied wholly by defendants, was approximately treble that
amount.'9 Although the court does not discuss the point, the bur-
den apparently rested on the defendants to show "the fairness of
the transaction," since neither the Shore Company board nor its
shareholders approved the rental agreement.
2
1
As a form of prospective relief, the plaintiffs urged the court
either to dissolve the two corporations, or to force the corporations
or the other shareholders thereof to purchase the shares held by
the plaintiffs. Such relief is obtainable under the South Carolina
Business Corporation Act of 1962.21 The court ordered the case
remanded for hearings as to what the proper relief would be under
these facts. 2 At least one writer has noted that fiduciary miscon-
duct such as discussed above may properly form the basis for
court-ordered dissolution of a corporation.2
Prior to his death, Max Shore made a gift of $54,000 of Clas-
sics preferred stock each to Jean Segall, her children, and the
families of Reuben and Sidney Shore. Beginning in June 6, 1971,
some of these shares in the hands of family members of Reuben
and Sidney Shore were redeemed. 24 In April 19, 1972, it was
agreed by the parties that the shares in the hands of Jean Segall
and her children would be redeemed. This redemption, however,
never occurred and was opposed by the defendants in this action.
Nonetheless, the court held that equity would allow redemption
of the preferred shares held by Jean Segall and her children.25
19. 264 S.C. at 454-55, 215 S.E.2d at 902.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Also, Folk, The Model Act and
the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275, 303-05 (1963); Folk, The South
Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations and Prospects, 15 S.C.L. REV. 467, 479-81
(1963); Freeman, Directors and Officers, 15 S.C.L. REv. 396, 408-09 (1963).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.15 (Cum. Supp. 1975) sets forth the grounds for court-
ordered dissolution. The grounds set forth in § 12-22.15(a)(4) and 12-22.15(a)(5) appar-
ently would be apposite here. See, Folk, The South Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsi-
derations and Prospects, 15 S.C.L. REV. 467, 487-89 (1963); Smythe, Dissolution of
Corporations, 15 S.C.L. REV. 435, 439-43 (1963). S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Cum. Supp.
1975) provides for alternate relief to dissolution, including court-ordered purchase of dis-
senters' shares.
22. 264 S.C. at 455, 215 S.E.2d at 902.
23. F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS §§ 3.15, 3.16, 3.17 (1975).
24. Most of the shares were redeemed in 1971 prior to Max Shore's death; $36,000
worth of the shares were redeemed following the founder's death.
25. 264 S.C. at 451-52, 215 S.E.2d at 900-01.
[Vol. 28
5
Reardon: Corporate and Business Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
This holding is consistent with section 5-18 of the South
Carolina Business Corporation Act,26 which authorizes the issu-
ance of redeemable shares. Although the statute prohibits issu-
ance or redemption of shares "which by their terms purport to
grant to any holder thereof the right to require the corporation to
redeem such shares, '2 7 the relief sought by the plaintiffs is not
prohibited. The plaintiffs were not demanding redemption under
any grant given by the preferred shares, but rather sought only
to be treated equally with other preferred shareholders once the
decision to redeem had been made. 8
This case29 highlights the problems that can arise from inade-
quate estate and business planning. Many problems of the type
that arose here can be avoided by proper estate planning, proper
choice of business organization, and careful drafting of partner-
ship agreements and corporate charters. By use of such planning,
a business founder and his attorney can provide for the painless
transfer of family business property to succeeding generations
without wasting business assets on the kind of avoidable litiga-
tion found in this case.
Patrick A. Reardon
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15.18 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15.18(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
28. The first redemption of preferred shares followed a resolution of Classics' Board
of Directors approving the redemption. 264 S.C. at 451, 215 S.E.2d at 901. Presumably
the articles of incorporation of Classics authorized redemption so as to satisfy the Business
Corporation Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15.18(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
29. In addition to the issues discussed supra, the court ruled that the facts supported
a finding that mutual funds purchased by the decedent were intended for Jean Segall and
that the proceeds were to be distributed to her and Max Shore's grandchildren under an
agreement signed by the defendants.
1976] 289
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